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Liberalization and Structural Adjustments in Argentina
Argentina is a country with enormous growth potential with vast 
human and natural resources. At the beginning of this century, Argentina was 
one of the wealthiest nations on earth, and many people believed it would be 
a world leader as the twentieth century progressed. Her position in the 
Americas in terms of total and per capita GNP was second only to the USA; 
when compared to European countries, it was certainly above that of Italy and 
Spain. By the 1980s, Argentina's total GNP was fifth in the Americas and she 
was below Italy and Spain in total and per capita figures.! Between the 1920's 
and the 1980s Argentina went from being a resilient country growing at an 
impressive speed to a country mired in stagnation and uncontrollable 
inflation. Excessive populism, the import-substitution-in dustrialization 
model, and far reaching state intervention all played key roles in this regretful 
process. During the 1970's and 1980s, attempts were made by both military and 
democratic governments to correct the situation; they both had abysmal 
results. Today another democratically elected government is giving it a try. 
Ironically, the party in power is the same one responsible for the creation of 
this structure, and the steps being taken stand a serious chance of alienating, 
possibly permanently, the party's prime base of support -  the labor unions.
This paper will attempt to analyze how this economically paralyzing structure 
came about, some of the failed attempts at reforming it, and the current 
program's chance for success.
i
I. The Breeding Grounds for Change
The first challenge to the laissez-faire economic model that had given 
Argentina such spectacular growth during the second half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century accompanied the 1930 coup. Besides 
undermining a democratic consolidation that had been in place since the 1912 
passage of the Saefiz Pefta law, the nationalist contingent in the coup sought to 
reduce Argentina's vulnerability to the world market and to foster her own 
industrial development. These were sensible economic policies 
during the Great Depression of the 1930‘s. Export markets quickly had dried up 
after the United States and then Europe erected prohibitive tariffs. Inward 
looking policies throughout Argentina’s former export markets severely 
reduced viable economic alternatives. In the 1930 s, Argentina's terms of trade 
deteriorated by 34%; its exports dropped off and foreign currency shortages led 
to balance of payment problems. To combat the currency short age, exchange 
controls were erected and the currency devalued. This spurred national 
industrialization.
Besides the onset of economic intervention, restrictive democracy, 
constitutional disregard, and the politicization of the military, the 1930’s 
witnessed another trend that would be pertinent for the political 
developments of the 1940’s and the subsequent fifty years. Despite the 
polarization of world politics and the growth in popularity of extremist 
ideologies (such as fascism and communism), Argentina's labor movement 
became more moderated Anarchism was decreasing in popularity, and 
communism had vet to make inroads in the labor movement.4
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in 1943, the second in what would become a series of military coups 
ousted die conservative regime that had been backed by the landed oligarchy. 
During the next few years, an army colonel by the name of Juan Doming Per6n 
would rapidly collect both government titles and the support of large sectors cf 
the disenfranchised.
Despite the open democracy between 1912 and 1930, no political party 
nor charismatic leader had successfully garnished labor's political backing. 
This was partially due to both the high percentage of foreign-born workers 
without Argentine citizenship and the appeal of anarchism in the labor
movement at that time.
History had thus provided an opportune chance for someone to politi 
cally capitalize, and Juan Perdn was in the position to do so. Assigned to the 
position of Secretary of tabor and Social Provision, Peron quickly gained the 
popular support by granting rights to organized labor. Since the Semana
Trflyica in 1919, the labor movement had undergone varying waves of repres­
sion. Simply granting labor the legal rights to organize, bargain collectively, 
and declare strikes was all that was needed to begin his courtship of the 
moderate and more conciliatory Socialist wing of the labor movement.
As 1943 gave way to 1944 and 1945, both his acquisition of power and his 
support and political popularity grew. "Peron dominated the unions he or 
ganized, and made them not only tools of the government but a political force 
loyal to him personally. As a result, his power grew enormously."^ Besides 
having the labor office upgraded to a ministerial position, he was able to 
acquire the titles of Minister of War and Vice-President. Meanwhile, he was 
able to use his position at the head of the labor ministry to intervene in labor 
disputes. For the first time in the history of the Argentine labor movement,
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someone was intervening on their behalf. The overwhelming support of the
lower classes that he had been able to acquire saved him from political
oblivion after sectors of the military, that had grown suspicious of his grasp for
power, had him exiled in mid-November 1945, Eight days later a political
demonstration the likes of which Argentina had never seen both stunned the
government and induced them to quickly retrieve him. Elections were quickly
scheduled for 1946.
II. Construction of the Statist Economy 
Political Support and Opposition
Despite an united opposition composed of every part of the ideological
spectrum, Perdn’s personalistic, quasi-party swept the elections. His first term 
in office would prove vital for the consolidation of power over labor and a 
strong nationalist movement.
To begin with, Peron was able to both manipulate and buy the backing of 
organized labor. The creation of the CGT (General labor Confederation) 
established one legal union for every industry. Each union was incorporated 
into a corporatist structure which Peron wanted to extend to all aspects of 
Argentine society. By centralizing so much power he, with the aid of his wife 
Evita, was able to reward his supporters and spurn Communist labor leaders 
who viewed him as an exploitative opportunist. Government, that is Peron, 
could now intervene at any moment and in effect dominate the entire labor 
movement.
Enthusiasm and support among the rank and file was purchased via
progressive labor legislation and tremendous increase in real wages. ’The
change in the structure of employment, the general increase in wages, the
fixing of ceiling prices on staple commodities, and the freezing of urban and
rural rents, all contributed to raise the share of favor in domestic income,"'*
Ten years earlier both striking and shiftless workers quickly found them selves
out of work; now both were practically guaranteed employment. It became
nearly impossible to fire or lay off workers. Between 1946 and 1949, real wages
rose by over 45%; and despite a fall over the next two years, wages were still
28% higher than in 1946 by election time.5
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A certain degree of both nationalistic and industrial class support had 
been acquired through Perdn's involvement in the Farrell government, 1943- 
43, that had sought to develop local industry through military imperatives and 
protectionist policies. Sentiment increased even more during the massive 
nationalization push between 1946 and 1949. Utilities, railroads, and other 
vital industries were all nationalized in an attempt to demonstrate national 
sovereignty. Despite the lack of any substantial economic gain, national­
izations were tremendously popular among sectors of the public who had 
grown tired of international vulnerability Nationalist support was-crucial in 
maintaining a balance in the military against those factions who viewed his 
actions with suspicion and those who envied his power and position.
Certain industrialists were also fond of Peron. To promote industrial 
growth, Peron established an Industrial Bank that provided easy credit to both 
new and old enterprises.6 1leavy protection, government subsidies, and low- 
interest loans allowed Argentina’s infant industries to expand production with 
little incentive for lowering production costs. Continued industrial growth 
was a must for Peron for as the industrial base expanded so did Perun's power 
base.
To partially fund these populist escapades and finance the capital needed 
for further industrialization, Peron created a system of exchange controls via 
the I API (Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade) in 1946. 'This 
government agency was given a monopoly of the purchase of grains and meat. 
These products were bought at prices lower than world prices and sold abroad 
at a large profit”? As long as foreign reserves and agricultural exports held up, 
both labor and industry could be satisfied by Peron's policies. It was not until 
Per6ft*s second term when balance of payment became more chronic that the
inherent differences between these two contingencies be came more 
pronounced.
While many sectors of Argentine society benefited as never before because 
of Perdn's policies, others were not so lucky. The conservative oligarchy that 
had controlled the country from the signing of the 1853 Constitution until the 
1943 coup, with the exception of 1916-1930, and who had benefited most from 
the Agro-Export economic structure bore the financial brunt of Peron's 
policies. The reasons for this were simple. They had controlled the regime 
that Perbn had helped overthrow in 1943, and the odds of gaining their 
support or building a significant power base around them were minuscule.
The IAPI taxed traditional agricultural exports which thereby reduced both 
their both the elite s income and its incentives for further agricultural 
production. Domestic price controls on food, import controls, and a 
nationalized banking system that manipulated and severely reduced funds 
available for agricultural investment all caused the traditionally wealthy to feel 
the pinch of Peron's social justice.
Other sectors in Argentine society were annoyed at Poron for different 
reasons. The Radical Civic Union disliked his demagoguery and blatant dis­
regard for both party politics and democratic norms. The Communists and the 
radical left despised him for his co-option of the working class. Business 
groups had been left paralyzed by Peron's exuberant labor legislation. 
Eventually, farmers, merchants, and eventually industrialists put aside their 
differences in order to defend themselves against Peronist labor. As the econ­
omy turned stagnant, political friction became harder to divert while 
Argentina grew more polarized.8
7
IVron’s Economic Policies and Their Effects
Per6ns economic policies have already been hinted at strongly in the 
previous section due to the serious political ramifications they had. First of all, 
there was a clearly populist policy aimed at cementing his labor power base. At 
the center of this were enormous wage hikes, a proliferation of social services 
such as early retirement and liberal pensions, and price controls on popular 
items such as food and rents. These excessive outlays often exceeded the 
financial ability of the Argentine government, and further added to the 
chronic fiscal woes.9 From the onset, government involvement in the 
economy grew steadily. By 1950, government expenditures were 30% greater 
than the 1940-45 period. W By the time Per6n was pushed out of office, the 
Agro-Fxport economic structure was just a memory.
The Peronist regime also implemented some of the most protectionist 
measures that Argentina has ever known. The fixed-ex change rate soon be 
come very overvalued as widespread expenditures on "social justice” lead to 
inflation lates of over 20% every year between 1946 and 1952.11 In 1950, for 
example, the official exchange rate for exports was 5 pesos to the dollar, 
although the equilibrium rate for foreign exchange was probably about 15 
pesos. 12 The intended effect of this was to make foreign goods very expensive 
and spur the expansion of domestic industrialization, but there were negative 
side effects. An overvalued peso and the lAPI’s fore-mentioned export taxes 
caused a fall in agricultural investment and eventually agricultural output. 
This would cripple continued economic expansion. Without the foreign 
exchange that agricultural exports earned, desperately needed capital and in 
termediary imports could not be made. Under this new statist structure, scarce
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capital and low foreign reserves made it impossible for both industry and 
agriculture to develop simultaneously.^ Labor demands added another 
component to this cyclical stop-and-go structure that would prevail for the next 
45 years.
To the extent that Per6n was seeking industrial self-sufficiency, he 
partially succeeded. "By 1955, 99 percent of consumer goods used in Argentina 
were manufactured in Argentina."^ International dependence, however, 
was only transformed. Imports of durable and non-durable consumer goods 
did drop sharply, but orders for all sorts of intermediary products (e.g. fuels, 
lumber, metallic intermediate products, etc.) and capital good soared. 15 This 
type of dependence combined with reduced exports, although more damaging 
for long-term economic growth, was hidden from the everyday consumer.
After all, products now said "made in Argentina" and to many this signified a 
sign of national independence.
Nationalization schemes added to the fiscal woes and problems that 
would plague the country for the next half-century. Between 1946 and 1949, 
hundreds of millions of dollars were squandered on the purchase of public 
utilities, the telephone system, the merchant fleet, the airlines, and most 
notoriously, the railroads. 16 Politically, this amounted to quite a popular 
move displaying a step towards greater national sovereignty, but the prices 
paid for many of the enterprises were excessive, especially considering their 
vintage and quality (e.g. the railroads). Ultimately, huge sums of foreign 
reserves that Argentina had built up during the war were squandered. Some 
opponents rebuke that a great quantity of these reserves, those held by Britain 
in the form of Sterling, were virtually useless as they could not be converted
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into dollars nor draw interest. 1? Still, this did not divert Australia from using 
its massive sterling reserves to import valuable British-made capital goods.
Perdn's hostility towards foreign capital was evident in the numerous 
nationalizations and strict foreign capital laws. As a result, a chronic shortage 
of capital developed, and capital accumulation started to unravel. By 1955, 
aggregate capital per inhabitant was 5 percent less in 1955 than in the 1925-29 
period and capital per inhabitant in the basic services (electricity, 
communications, and transport -- those nationalized during this period) fell by 
18 percent.18 As a general rule, decreasing capital per inhabitant leads to lower 
productivity and that to lower wages and standards of living. In an attempt to 
avert this, hostilities toward foreign capital as well as agricul tural neglect 
started to change during Peron’s second administration.
The two main economic objectives during Peron's second administra­
tion were to restore the external factors (exports and foreign capital) to the 
dynamic positions they had played in the primary-export economy; second, to 
balance public finances by re ducing state intervention in the economy, 
stabilizing the general price level, and restricting credit to the private sector.19 
To revitalize agriculture, the IAPI began paying producers a higher share of 
export prices; and eventually payments were in excess of export prices as 
international commodity prices fell heavily in 1954 and 1955.20 in essence, 
this was the beginning of the recovery for the relative prices of agricultural 
goods. This policy was not full-borne, however, as domestic price controls 
remained in effect until after Perdn's forced departure in 1955. Strict for eign 
investment laws also became milder during this time. Measures such as 
guaranteeing the recovery of investments in the case of nationalization, the 
free entry of machinery equipment and other materials related to specific
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capital investments, and liberalizing the repatriation of profits and interest 
were offered to entice many of Argentina’s pre vious foreign investors to come 
back.
The overall results of this import-substitution scheme on the Argentine 
economy were mixed. Initially, growth was quite im pressive; between the 
beginning of 1946 and 1948, the economy grew by 23 percent.21 By the turn of 
the decade light-industrialization was beginning to reach its upper capacity as 
the domestic market became saturated; as a result, the negative effects of 
hothouse capitalism soon became apparent. Deep recessions in 1949 and 1952 
set the stage for growth cycles for the next 30 years. A stop-and-go cycle that 
followed the accumulation and depletion of foreign re serves became the 
norm. Growth that did occur was not evenly divided. Between 1948 and 1955, 
agricultural production grew at an anemic rate of 1 percent annually; 
meanwhile, industrial production increased by approxi mately 67 percent 
during the Perdn administrations increasing its share of GNP from 22.8 in 1946 
to 29.2 percent in 1955.22
Inflation became an almost annual Argentine problem during the 
Peronist decade. Government mandated increases in minimum wage levels, 
the deliberate policy of extending credit to the private sector in order to 
encourage economic development, and public expenditures intended to 
stimulate demand and broaden the scope of government action, including 
nationalization of public utilities and other enterprises all caused price levels 
to increase by nearly 100 percent between 1946 and 1949.23 inflation remained 
high throughout most 1950-55 as well. Although these figures would seem 
like complete price stability by the 1980s, they were quite high by international
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standards and when combined with a fixed exchange rate worked against both 
export growth and import reduction.
As inflation grew in the late 1940's so did budget deficits. In 1948, the 
federal budget deficit hit a whopping 13.8 percent of GDP; and although this 
number would shrink to 9.8 percent in 1949 and to near the 5-6 percent range 
in the early 1950's, budget deficits, like inflation, became a permanent fixture of 
Argentina’s economy plaguing the economy for decades to come and causing 
the ruin of both growth and stabilization plans.24
It should be noted that Perdn's feeble attempts to right some of the 
structural wrongs during his second term generally failed. First of all, the 
expansion in agricultural production that did occur failed to make up for the 
greater drop in international prices. In addition to this, the virtual economic 
stagnation after 1948, fears of Peron’s nationalistic rhetoric, and exclusion from 
public services all combined to keep foreign investment from recaptur ing its 
former role.
The lack of domestic competition, restrictions on imports, the rigidity of 
the agricultural supply, powerful unions, occasional devaluations, and large 
budget deficits all combined to turn Argentina into a hotbed of rampant 
inflation and economic stagnation that would become sicker and sicker with 
each passing decade.
Needless to say, Perdn’s government was strong and deter mined and 
ruled in a similarly strong-handed manner. Despite this, his power did have 
its boundaries. The legalization of divorce and the proposal of legalized 
prostitution pushed the Catholic Church into the anti-Perdn coalition, and on 
September 17,1955 a military coup displaced Peron issuing in a near 20 year 
period of revolving weak civilian and military governments.
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The Build-Up to a Crisis (1955-1975)
During the eighteen years of Peron’s exile, increased polarization and a 
lack of compromise drove Argentine society deeper into peril. Paul H. Lewis 
describes it in the following way:
Politics became a zero-sum game, with the losers refusing to 
accept defeat. For labor, the strike, the factory occupation, and 
sabotage became weapons to employ when decisions went against 
them. Employers responded with the lockout and the withdrawal 
of capital from the country. Argentina had less and less sense of 
common purpose, despite the clamorous nationalism that often 
often crept into public debates 25
Left wing guerrilla groups, such as the Montoneros and the ERP (People’s 
Revolutionary Army), sprung up with Peron’s exiled blessing. Slowly but 
surely society was becoming ungovernable.
During the 1955-76 period, the economy continued its stop and go cycle. 
Foreign exchange bottlenecks would develop because export receipts were 
stagnating or falling. A shift in policy that favored exports usually meant that 
labor and industry would have to suffer. Favorable export policies usually 
lasted until the international balance sheet recovered. Then labor and 
industrial protests would force a shift in policy and a renewed expansion. As 
expansion began sucking in vast quantities of capital good and intermediate 
products, foreign exchange bottlenecks would reemerge, and the process would 
begin anew.26
Very serious economic crises developed in 1959 and 1975. The 1959 
incidence was a result of Frondizi's austerity program, and recovery soon 
followed. The 1975 crisis, on the other hand, signaled the entrance of one of 
the darkest periods in Argentine history. Not only did it usher in nearly six­
teen years of uninterrupted triple-digit inflation and a series of economic and 
financial crises that bit at each other's heals but it also marked the beginning of 
state-sponsored terrorism.
After a brief slow-down in guerrilla violence in the wake of Perrin's 
return, kidnappings and terrorist violence quickly surged past its pro-1973 
levels when Peron publicly rebuked the far-left members of the Peronist 
coalition. Ungovernability intensified with Peron’s death in July of 1974. 
Isabel, his wife and successor, then took over the reigns of government with 
little sense of direction or power. Inflation soared to unprecedented heights: 
738 percent between March 1975 and March 1976.27 Interest rates turned 
sharply negative, and investment fell like a rock: 15.6 percent in the second 
half of 1975 and 16.5 percent in the first quarter of 1976.2# The onset of a nasty 
recession in mid-1975 and large budget deficits financed overwhelmingly by 
monetary expansion made matters even worse. With the Minister of 
Economy changing almost as often as the seasons, she refused to commitment 
to any one economic plan; the public quickly lost all trust in the government. 
Government fostering of right-wing death squads and vigilant added to 
violent societal confrontation making society as ungovernable as the economy. 
A military coup was just a question of time.
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III. 1976-81: A Failed Attempt At Restructuring
On March 24, 1976, the most brutal and repressive regime since the 
signing of the 1853 Constitution, if not Argentina's entire history, displaced 
Isabel Peron. The military government set three targets for themselves: (1) to 
eliminate the guerrilla movements; (2) to eradicated the hyper-inflation that 
was reaching an annual rate of 1,500 percent in 1976; and (3) to create the basis 
for a workable democracy.29
To accomplish these goals, the military junta took a series of actions, all 
of which particularly hurt the traditional Peronist and leftist sectors of society. 
Congress was closed; political parties banned; and political liberties restricted in 
attempt to depoliticize society. Government setting of wages, the abolition of 
both the right to strike, and the suspension of collective bargaining sought to 
destabilize the Peronist labor movement and slow down inflation. Wide­
spread repression, in which thousands were kid napped and killed, served not 
only to destroy the actual terrorists and guerrillas, but also to further subvert 
left-wing political and trade union activists in addition to a large section of the 
intelligencia.30 Economic policies, besides halting inflation and providing a 
basis for long-term growth, had the implied intention of destroying the 
protectionist economy that had sponsored years of virtual stagnation and that 
had fueled the social and political upheavals of the late 1960’s and 1970‘s.
On April 2, 1976, the military junta named Jose Martinez de Hoz to
mastermind economic reprogramming. Me, like the military junta that had
chosen him, had three main objectives: ”To pass from a speculative economy
to a productive one, to improve the position of the external sector, and to
attain economic growth through increased investment."^ To reverse the
15
crisis, steps would have to be taken to curtail spending, increase tax revenues, 
curb Central Bank deficit financing, and control wage increases 32 Although 
the economic goals remained fairly constant throughout 1976-81, a pre­
announced devaluation exchange rate, known as the tablita, separates the 
period into two distinct sections: 1976-78 and 1979-81.
1976-78: Temporary Recovery and Recession : Relapse 
Curtailing public spending involved attempts to cut back outlays and 
grants to state-owned enterprises. Included in this was the first serious 
attempts to reduce the role of the state in the economy and privatize. In 1977, 
the government reduced the workforce in the state-owned railways and other 
public enterprises, sold private company stock held by the Banco Naciona! De 
Desarrollo, and liquidated some of the unproductive assets held by the s ta ted  
Ambitions, however, turned out to be greater than action. The military junta 
took advantage of their power and increased their share of the budget while 
others were being squeezed. The end result was a negligible fall in the size of 
the budget. Privatizations were also limited.^4 Certain in dustries that had 
gone under the government’s wings during previous admin istrations when 
they were unable \o meet the financial demands of hefty la bor legislation were 
the only ones even considered for divestment. To priva tize the state-owned 
steel mills, electrical power generators, or parts of the labricaciones Militares 
would have gone against the junta's vested interest in the military industrial 
complex. Lastly, cutting the national payroll proved to be a futile task. 
’’Employees fired from the central administration were transferred to state 
enterprises and autonomous agencies.”35 The inability to effectively cut the 
government’s payroll caused the fall in budget deficits to bottom out at 
unattainably high levels. Although the budget deficit, as a per centage of GDP,
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fell from the 15,1 percent of 1976 to 11.8 percent in 1977, it bounced back up in 
1978, and by the time Gen. Videla and Martinez de Hoz left office in 1981 deficit 
levels had exceeded their previous 1975-76 highs.
Tax collection did improve during this period. Revenues in January- 
June 1977 were 82 percent higher, in real terms, than that of the same period in 
1976.36 A stiffer tax collection policy was designed in which evasion would be 
more tightly controlled, debt would be indexed, and evasion fines would be 
raised.37 The increased receipts brought about by greater compli ance were 
soon offset, however, by a process of removing export duties and import taxes 
that began in 1978.
I larsh takeover of the labor movement by the government led caused 
the working class to bare an enormous share of the economic burden. Wages 
set by government caused real wages to fall nearly 40 percent between 1975 and 
1977, 36 percent alone in 1976.38 Wages remained very low throughout the 
entire Martinez de Hoz tenure approaching 1970 levels only in 1980. One of 
the only concessions granted to labor during the Videla government was an 
authorization in late 1977 that tied wage increases to increases in labor pro­
ductivity^
It is interesting to note that as the fall in real wages bottomed out in 1977 
so did the substantial fall in the inflation rate. Despite a reduction in Central 
Bank "financing" and a draconian wage policy, inflation remained stubbornly 
above 100 in 1977 and beyond. The persistence of high inflation in 1978 was 
attributed to the difficulty in controlling the money supply, caused by large 
trade surplus and an influx of foreign capital (both desired by the government), 
and continuing inflationary expectations.^ Another factor adding to 
inflationary pressure was the oligopolistic economic structure of the country.
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In face of the 1978 recession, entrepreneurs raised their prices considerably in 
order to maintain their incomc.41 Unlike open, competitive economies 
where prices are more-or-less determined by the market, profits fall in 
recessions. In more closed economies, such as Argentina’s in the 1970’s, where 
the business structure is more oligopolistic, falling profit margins can be halted 
by increasing prices.
Despite its mixed domestic performance, the external sector improved 
greatly between 1976 and 1978. By 1978, Argentina was registering a record $2.8 
billion dollar trade surplus.42 Argentina also began selling bonds in the 
financial markets of Kurope, the United States, and Japan in September of 1977, 
after a nearly ten year hiatus.43 First attempts at increasing domestic 
competition via reduced tariffs was also initiated during this time.
Capital flow and foreign investment remained speculative during the 
first three years, fleeing during the financial chaos of early 1976 and then 
flooding the financial district of Buenos Aires in late 1977 and early 1978 with 
an excess of over $1 billion dollars attracted by high interest rates.44 These 
short-term investments took another form in mid-1978 when local currency 
deposits became mandatory , in hopes of controlling monetary expansion and 
thus slowing inflation Long-term investment did tend to grow during this 
period. "Movements of long-term private autonomous capital, on the other 
hand, showed a positive balance of 1,400 million dollars, 300 million of which 
was direct investment."^
As noted, the first three years of the adjustment program had yielded 
some benefits, but inflation was still very high; the Argentine economy was 
still very speculative; and sustained economic growth was absent. To correct
18
these ills, end inflationary expectations, and subdue speculation, economic 
policies were redefined in late 1978.
1979-81: The 20 de Diciembre Plan
Continued high inflation, inflationary expectations, an uncompetitive 
industrial and manufacturing sector, and a world awash in petrodollars all 
influenced the key changes in economic policy in late 1978. On December 20, 
1978, Martinez de Hoz introduced a new plan to break the backbone of infla­
tion and accomplish his original economic goals. “The 'Plan 20 de Diciembre' 
had three main ingredients: a) the now (amoustablila: b) commercial policy 
liberalization; and c) a shift of public finance away from the Central Bank 
towards the capital market (both internal and external)."4 b The high interest 
rates, use of state-enterprises as macroeconomic tool, and the massive foreign 
borrowing that this plan generated led to its eventual destruction and a plunge 
into an even messier crisis in 1981.
Thetablita was a type of fixed exchange rate in which the devaluation of 
the peso was pre-announced. It was believed that pre-announced devaluations 
would decrease inflationary expectations and speculative activities. Since 
devaluation would be pre-announced, investors would not have to worry 
about the their investment earnings would disappear in the face of large 
unannounced devaluations.47 Each month the currency was scheduled to 
devalue at a decreasing rate. Starting at a rate of 5.3 percent in January 1979, the 
rate of devaluation was scheduled to reach 0 by March 1981.48 by then 
Martinez de Hoz theorized, domestic inflation would be in line with inter­
national inflation and inflationary and speculative problems would be cured.
Several obstacles got in the way of the programs success. The first of 
these was that monthly inflation rates constantly outpaced devaluation rates.
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The price of services, for example, rose at a monthly rate of 7.9 percent in 1979 
while the average monthly devaluation equaled 4.1 percent; by the end of 1979, 
the value of the peso had risen 87 percent relative to the U. S. dollar.49 
Meanwhile as 1979 and 1980 wore on, it became obvious that the tablita and the 
commercial liberalization policy were having some effect in controlling the 
price growth of internationally tradable items. But, "Wages and the prices of 
goods without any direct relation with foreign trade re sponded much less to 
this influence, as reflected in the cost of living index, which continued to rise 
at a rate of around WZ during 1980, compared with an increase in the price of 
foreign exchange of only about 20*3 ,"50 Such enormous distortions in relative 
prices came to be incompatible with the mainte nance of activities in many 
economic sectors and with the external equilibrium of the economy.51
Another flaw in at least the application of the plan was that domestic 
interest rates, although negative in domestic currency throughout most of 
1979, grew very large for foreign investors as the exchange rate disparities grew 
more pronounced. This caused an enormous influx of speculative funds 
seeking high returns, nearly $5 billion alone in 1979.52 Such a massive in flux, 
in addition to the 1979 trade surplus worked against lower inflation, due to the 
increase in the money supply it created.
The policy of trade liberalization, although ambitious in rhetoric, was 
rather timid and gradual.53 This is not to say that it had no effects. In com­
bination with the increasingly over-valued exchange rate, which acted as an 
import subsidy, liberalization proved to be quite destructive to domestic 
manufactures. Consumer good imports grew by over 200 percent in 1979 
alone; large increases in imports in categories where for many years there were 
virtually none, such as clothing and footwear, caused further industrial
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hardship 54 By the end of 1981, industrial output was nearly 20 percent below 
its 1975 level, and manufacturing as a percentage of GNP had shrunk from 37.3 
percent in 1975 to 22.1 percent in 1981 (lower than the 1945 level).55 if 
Martinez de Hoz and Gen. Videla had unspecified aims of gutting the basis for 
Peronist support, the industrial labor base, they succeeded. The industrial 
recession became one of the worst in Argentine history.
The third important component of the plan was a shift in the budget 
deficit was financed. The sale of government bonds in international markets 
in combination with heavy state-enterprise borrowing plunged Argentina deep 
into debt. Between 1978 and 1981, public external debt increased from just over 
$8 billion to over $20 billion, a growth rate of nearly 34 percent a year; 
meanwhile private sector international debt soared from $4 billion to $15.6 
billion.56 An United Nations Annual report summed up the situation in the 
following way:
Thus at the end of 1980 the economy was displaying some 
serious distortions. Heavy external debt had been contracted, but 
it was reflected in an increase in consumption and transfers of 
residents' funds to the exterior, rather than in greater investment.
The debt of business with the domestic financial system had also 
grown considerably under pressure of the high rates of interest, 
and the possibilities for their payment under normal conditions 
seemed doubtful. The structure of relative prices, which was 
clearly biased in favor of non-tradable goods, was also difficult to 
sustain .57
A special note must be made about state-enterprises during this time. 
Before 1979, the military regime had tried to use them as macroeconomics
21
tools in decreasing the government deficit: privatization's, reduced expend­
itures, and attempts to trim their payrolls. In December of 1978, however, their 
role changed, and for the duration of the 20 de Diciembre Plan they were used 
as macroeconomic tool against inflation. Public sector tariffs were set to 
increase by less than the rate of inflation, thus reducing inflationary inertia. 
Real price levels in these sectors (electricity, gas water, transport, 
communication, and fuel) decreased by 30 percent relative to wholesale 
prices.58 Jo  finance the widening deficits that naturally occurred , public sector 
enterprises, like those in manufacturing, increased their use of domestic and 
international credit after Central Bank "financing’’ became more restrictive.
As a result both public and private debt exploded between 1978 and 1981. A 
large portion of this debt was short-term, which meant that as the value of the 
peso disappeared, as terms of trade worsened, and as real international interest 
rates catapulted upwards possibility of loan defaults jumped immensely.
Abandonment of the Plan and an Evaluation of 1976-81 
With heavy trade and current account deficits, expectations of an 
enormous devaluation increased. As in 1975, speculation and external sector 
deficits were causing foreign reserves to evaporate. "The minor devaluation 
in February 1981, which destroyed the credibility of both the exchange rate table 
and the Central Bank led to two major devaluations (one in March and 
another in May) and finally the abandonment of the exchange rate system in 
June, 1 9 8 1 . Capital fled the country in an unprecedented fashion, and 
things went from bad to worse. Devaluation after devaluation caused the peso 
to depreciate by 400 percent in 1981.60 Devaluations, however, failed to have 
the desired effect of stimulating domestic production or easing the balance of 
payment problems.
In 1976, the military came to power to correct the economic woes, 
eradicate terrorism, and reshape both the economy and society in such a way 
that the polarization and societal tragedies of pre-1976 would never occur 
again.
Terrorism, at least that not sponsored by the state, had successfully been 
eliminated. The process had been crude and brutish, lacking any respect for 
civil liberties, but it had been successful.
On the other hand, the military regime failed miserably at trying to 
improve the situation of the economy. By the end of 1981, the country was in 
the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930's. Speculative 
tendencies were stronger than ever. "It is estimated that during the years of 
military rule some $42 billion was transferred from the productive sector of the 
economy to the speculative arena."61 Inflation, although lower than the 1975 
average, was beginning to spiral out of control once more, and a ballooning 
foreign debt not only made the entire economy more fragile but would act as 
an additional impediment to growth for the rest of the decade. Investment 
levels were some of the lowest in decades, and nearly anyone who could was 
sending their capital abroad. To top it off, bankruptcies were spreading like 
wildfire. By all accounts the economics maladies were worse in 1981 than in 
the 1975-76 crisis.
The regime’s third and final objective had mixed results. The Peronist 
base of support had been severely weakened by government s policies. Not 
only had many of the Peronist-left been exterminated during the military 
repression, but the basis for further labor militancy had been harshly shaken. 
"The combined effects of coercion and the reopening of the Argentine 
economy undermined the economic and social power of labor and the
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noncompetitive manufacturers.”*^ The economy did undergo some 
significant changes during this period, most of which were undesirable. 
However, enough of the remnants of the old economic structure existed to 
piece it together behind pro tectionist walls. Massive foreign debt and under­
investment had weakened the structure so much that it would not even be 
able to live up to its past meager performances.
Finally, the military partially succeeded in changing society.
Polarization had subsided as nearly all groups joined together in their protest 
against the military regime. If a coalition in support of military rule and 
monetarist economic had existed in 1976, excessive repression, utter economic 
failure, and an embarrassing defeat in the Faikland/Malvinas War had 
shattered it. In the end, the military as a political player was completely 
delegitimized. So in a perverse and largely unintentional way, the military 
had haphazardly created a climate more conducive for democracy.
Between 1981 and 1985, the economy retreated behind protective walls 
and managed a weak recovery beginning in 1983. Inflation, however, grew 
unabated reaching unprecedented heights in 1984 and 1985. Politically, the 
military retreated to their barracks, after a demoralizing defeat in the South 
Atlantic at the hands of Great Britain. Democracy was restored at the end of 
1983 with Rau I Alfonsfn, A Radical, soundly defeating his Peronist rival, Ital 
Ludar. Military human-rights trials took up a good deal of time and attention 
in 1984 and 1985, but economic problems quickly crept back into the spot light.
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IV. The Alfonsin Government: 1983-1989
Ire-Austral (December 1983-June 1985)
Labor had experienced a prolonged period of low real wages, and were
demanding a change. Alfonsin had promised labor a substantial wage increase
if he were elected. As a political move, this was probably a very idea.
Alfonsin’s party, the Radical Civic Union, traditionally did not have labor's
backing, and without a sizable number of labor's votes Alfonsin might not
have been elected. On the other hand, it was not wisest of economic decisions.
"The attempt to index salaries on a monthly basis to preserve their purchasing
power (as promised by the government during its electoral campaign ) pushed
the inflationary rates to a new monthly l e v e l . T h e  ability of labor to protect
itself from the effects of high inflation by pushing the costs onto someone else
set the stage for the hyper-inflation that was about to emerge.
In September 1984, desperately in need of relieve of some of its debt
service, the Alfonsin administration agreed to accept an IMF stabilization
program that included strong monetary t extraction, higher public utility rates,
and a devaluation of the peso. Not surprUingly, economic activity declined
while inflation grew worse. The inflationary effects ot the devaluation and
increases in utility prices found its way into a never-ending swirl of price
increases as indexation at all levels was able to push the cost of stabilization on
to someone else indefinitely . Within this context, not only did inflation grow
worse, but deficit targets were overshot, and the IMF agreement was
abandoned in January 1985.^4 it was obvious that Alfonsin was not going to
tolerate the horrendous recession that would have been nec essary to defeat
inflation; the political consequences were too great. Instead, Alfonsin and his
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new economic minister, Juan V. Sourroville, ventured into the unknown 
with an ambitious heterodox program
The Austral Plan
The Austral Plan was founded on several pillars, First of all, it promised 
a swift reduction in the government’s deficit and a halt on money creation by 
the Central Bank. Revenues would be increased by raising public sector tariffs, 
imposing import duties and export taxes, and a forced savings scheme. A few 
other taxes were to be raised, and the collection of taxes was to be sped up 
Second, a wage and price free/e in addition to a fixed exchange rate went into 
effect until further notice. Third, a series of conversions were set up to adjust 
outstanding contracts on the debt. Fourth, a new mone tary unit was 
introduced, the Austral. Lastly, the IMF accepted the program and it served as 
a basis for debt rescheduling with new money financing a significant part of 
arrears and current debt scrvices.65 "|n some ways, such as the attempt to 
ensure that prices were frozen near equilibrium levels, these plans [the Austral 
Plan and the 1988 Primavera Plan) were rather sophisticated.”^  in short, the 
plan sought to stop inertial inflation, and once and for all end the 
psychological inflationary expectations.
"The Austral Plan, with its wage and price freezes and its commitment 
not to finance the government deficit by printing more money, was initially 
very successful. Popular support, arguably, a major factor in this respect.”^ ^
The battle against inflation was initially very successful with consumers losing 
very little of their purchasing power. As a result, Alfonsin’s popularity surged 
in late 1985 helping the Radical Civic Union in a legislative renewal election in 
November.
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With de creased government spending, lower real wages, increased taxes, 
and the stabilization shock, it is surprising that the economy did not slip into a 
worse recession than it had during the first half of 1985. Increased stability and 
predictability caused demand to grow towards the end of 1985. ’in  the last 
quarter of 1985 overall seasonally adjusted GDP increased over 4% and 
industrial product rose by 13*3 . This reactivating of pro duction was 
maintained during 1986, leading to an increase in GDP of 5.7*3 .”68
Such an increase in demand was not entirely good in an economy with 
fixed wages and prices, first ol all, it caused the relative prices of food stuffs 
and services, which were not included in the freeze, to rise above their 
historical averages The disequilibria was heightened when prices were not 
allowed to rise with increased demand.1 In addition to this, prices were 
frozen during a period of high oscillation; and even though attempt were 
made to align relative prices to their historical equilibrium values, finding 
such an equilibrium of prices would be near impossible. Disequilibria pressure 
was increased with the increase in demand The pressure to readjust prices 
became one of the first reasons for the end of the Austral Plan.
The high real interest rates at first had a positive effect; they at tracted 
much capital that had fled earlier in the decade. Soon, however, the interest 
rates caused a buildup of domestic debt. Repaying these debts would add more 
money to the economy and worsen the inflationary picture, and maintaining 
such high rates would prove too costly for the state in the long-run.?0 Sooner 
rather than later, interest rates would have to fall; thus, a second factor was 
pushing for the end of the heterodox program.
Unfortunately, external factors played too large in both the end of the 
plan and its long-term failure. To begin with, Argentina’s terms of trade
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seriously declined towards the end of 1985 when the international prices for 
agricultural goods started to slide. Not only did this mean a reduction in 
foreign trade earnings, it also meant less fiscal revenue (export taxes), and thus 
larger budget deficits towards the end of 1986 and throughout 1987. This might 
not have been so tragic if the demands for foreign debt service had not been so 
great. Nearly half of all trade earnings were needed to service the debt; thus, 
necessary capital good imports were impossible.
The long-term effects of the Austral Plan were not nearly as positive as 
their short-term counterparts. Probably, the great effect was the lesson it taught 
the Argentine economy in preparing for future heterodox shocks. The mini* 
Austral, the Austral 11, and the Primavera Plan all failed miserably. All sectors 
of the economy learned that the higher the inflation rate got the greater the 
likelihood of a heterodox shock, and since prices would be frozen there was an 
advantage to keeping prices above their historical average. Thus, instead of 
reducing inflationary pressure; the Austral plan worsened it. To prepare for 
price freezes, prices were raised faster than they would have been otherwise. In 
short, the Austral Plan made speculation even more profitable and the 
economy less manageable.
Although Argentina's economic statistics in 1986 looked arguably better 
than any in over a decade, none of the former malaise had been effectively 
corrected, and once prices and wages thawed they soon reappeared. In simple 
terms, the economy reverted to its pre-Austral practices: contract in dexing, an 
excessive fiscal deficit, and uncertainty resulting from the struggle for income 
distribution, the large fiscal deficit, and the external debt71 As a result, 
monthly inflation grew from 2 percent in February 1986 to over 4 percent in
March and April; towards the end of 1986, it had surpassed 8 per cent, and by 
October 1987 it was once again pushing 20 percent.^
The Austral Plan failed to correct the terrible structural problems of the 
economy. One of these problems is the high degree of oligopolization of 
markets. "A report by Economy Minister Juan Sourrovilte himself shows how 
in recent years the top 200 companies have achieved a growing control over 
their areas.M?3 This would continue to generate economic maladies in the 
succeeding years. Oligopolies tend to increase prices instead of production to 
protect profit margins. "In an economy that continued to be basically closed, a 
lack of competition made it possible for oligopolistic firms and unusually 
aggressive unions to interact in sectoral games to raise their relative income 
share.”?* Thus, in the long-run, various structural causes for inflation 
worsened.
The public sector also went without substantial reform. Despite a drastic 
need to modernize and reinvest so efficiency could be improved, public 
enterprises experienced a sharp reduction in reinvestment and maintenance 
expenditure. The quality of services continued to deteriorate, and new voices 
suggesting privatization began to be heard 7$ Keeping utility rates above that 
of inflation during the Austral Plan helped reduce the federal bud get deficit, 
but it did little in the area of improving the quality or efficiency of services.
The Austral Plan’s biggest failures were that it was only short-term and 
the anchors it was founded upon were too quickly let loose. If a more gradual 
approach had been taken, inflationary pressures might not have gotten so 
quickly out of hand. As of March 1986, prices and wages were quickly thawed; 
the exchange rate was readjusted, and the Austral Plan was virtually 
abandoned. It would have been an opportune time to address some of the
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structural causes of inflation: the oligopolistic structure of industry, the closed 
economy with too little competition, inefficiencies in the public sector, the 
regressive tax structure, the profile of debt maturities, the vitality of supply, a 
weak and inefficient financial sector, and an inefficient distribution network
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None of these were ever achieved
According to William C  Cline, The Austral Han of June 1985, the 
Mini-Austral of March 1987, Austral il in October 1987, and the August 1988 
Spring Han all collapsed for essentially the same reason. The Alfonsin 
government was unable to dose the fiscal gap."?? With the initial price 
freezes, tax revenues rose sufficiently to let politicians procrastinate in 
reforming the tax structure, cutting spending, and controlling public enterprise 
losses.?** With the subsequent failure of each heterodox plan, the government 
grew less and less credible.
Evaluation of the Han and Other Reform Attempts 
This is not to say that Alfonsin was against reform nor did anything to 
move it forward. Some important reforms were designed by the Alfonsin 
government, although most were never fully implemented. One of these 
reforms was the relaxation of foreign investment restrictions.?9 Bilateral co­
operation agreements between Argentina and Italy and Spain were also signed. 
These treaties sought to increase foreign investment, the number of joint- 
ventures, and technical assistance. Ever increasing inflation, a down turn in 
economic growth in late 1987, and the continual economic instability, 
however, scared away more capital than these accords were able to attract. 
Alfonsin, to his credit, did bring up the issue of privatization.
Privatization was viewed as essential if Argentina was to escape its persisting 
economic crisis [that! would continue and perhaps worsen, quality of services
would continue to drop, and essential investments would not be 
forthcoming."^ Boisterous opposition from the public sector and the 
powerful CGT, the rank and file of the Peronist opposition, kept public support 
for privatization low throughout Alfonsfn’s term.81 A few privatizations did 
take place during the mid-1980’$, but like those of the previous military 
government, all divested companies had previously been private. Their 
subsequent post-privatization success would be taken into account by the 
successor government. Companies, such as Siam, that had been losing money 
at an annual rate of $15 million, operating at 30 percent capacity, and avoiding 
taxes and social security payments after privatization were operating at full 
capacity, paying taxes ($2.4 million in 1987) and social security, ail while in 
creasing payrolls, salaries, and production substantially.^ Unfortunately, 
privatization plans for bigger state enterprises, like the notorious commun­
ications monopoly, Entel, and the international airlines, Aereolineas 
Argentinas, were defeated by a stubborn Peronist opposition in the Congress.
Attempts at trade liberalization were also made during Alfonsin's 
tenure. The rationale was the same that it had been under the military gov­
ernment: international trade increases domestic competition thereby re­
straining inflation and increasing efficiency. Such discussions were also 
underway in Brazil, and in early 1986 the two countries signed PICE (Program 
of Interagration and Economic Cooperation). Closer economic ties helj. i  
substantially increase bilateral trade and change the way bureaucratic, eco­
nomic, and political elites thought of the other, from a competitor to a 
partner Although further plans for trade liberalization were initiated in 
1987, results were few due to Alfonsin’s eroding support. By 1989, Argentina
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was practically as closed economically as it had been in 1983 when Alfonsin as 
sumed office.
P relu d e  to the 1989 C ris is
The strong mandate Alfonsin received in the 1983 elections was sig­
nificantly received in the 1983 presidential election and the 1985 legislative 
election was significantly reduced in 1987. The concertaciort social, that 
Alfonsin had been able to develop during the 1983 election campaign through 
promises of wage increases, was lost during his first year in office. Failure to 
negotiate with members of the concertaciort before deciding on economic 
policy, IMF stabilization policies in September 1984, and political attempts to 
open CGT elections in hopes of displacing its traditional Peronist leaders all 
worked to undermine the concertaciort,. By the time the Austral Plan was 
initiated the concertaciort had clearly passed.^ Increased work stoppage in 
conjunction with the 1987 Easter military uprising, in which it became evident 
that Alfonsin had bargained with the military, led to an electoral rebound for 
the Peronist party in September of 1987. Faced by an opposition majority in the 
Senate and only a marginal majority in the Chamber of Deputies, presidential 
initiatives were increasingly stunted. Credibility continued to evaporate in 
1988 as one economic plan was scrapped for an other, recession set in anew and 
a chances for a second presidential term disappeared. By July 1989, things were 
in such a deplorable that Alfonsin abdicated the presidency 5 months early. 
"Many in the government understood very well that the root causes of the 
country's stagnation are a semi-closed economy and a large and extremely 
inefficient public sector . .  . but his attempts to lower protection, deregulate, and 
privatize were timid and circumscribed."^
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1989  w ill g o  d o w n  as o n e  o f th e  w o rst, if  not th e w o rst, y ear in A rg e n tin e
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e c o n o m ic  h isto ry . An e x p a n sio n a ry  m o n e ta ry  su p p ly  and w o rse n in g  
sp e c u la tio n  ca u se d  in fla tio n  to  sp in  o u t o f con tro l in to  o n e  ot the w o rst h y p e r­
in fla tio n s  in h isto ry  P rice s  w ere ris in g  at 200 p ercen t a m o n th  as the cu rre n cy  
co lla p se d  and  the C en tra l Bank tried  d e sp e ra te ly  to its  p rin tin g  p re sse s  ah ead  o f 
i n f l a t i o n T e c h n i c a l  d ifficu lties  th at the P rim av era  P lan  had p ro d u ce d  
c o m b in e d  w ith  e x p e cta tio n s  o f ch a o s re su ltin g  fro m  M e n e m ’s e x p e cte d  
p re s id e n tia l v ic to ry  g a v e  b irth  to sp e cu la tiv e  se lf-d e stru ctio n . M en em  had
ca m p a ig n e d  on  a p o p u lis t p latform  o f larg e w age in crea se s and an u n d efin ed
"p ro d u c tiv e  r e v o lu t io n ."8 ^ Su ch  p ro m ise s  fr ig h te n ed  the w ea lth y  an d  the
b u s in e ss  co m m u n ity . T o re se e in g  d iffic u ltie s  a h e a d , A rg e n tin e s  b o u g h t 
d o lla rs , w h ich  in crea se d  the p ro b a b ility  o f a M en em  v ictory , w h ich  in turn  
in crea se d  the d em an d  for d o llars , and  on and o n .”88  C I )P , w h ich  had  fallen
2.8  p e rce n t in 1988, co llap sed  a n o th e r  4 ,6  p ercen t in 1989. Real w ag es 
p lu m m e te d  55 p e rce n t to a post-VVorld W ar II low , and u n e m p lo y m e n t 
v au lted  to n ea rly  8  p e rce n t.89 Inept p o licy  a p p lica tio n , sp e cu la tio n , an d  a 
s tif lin g  sta tis t e co n o m y  had g iv en  b irth  to a crisis  so  se v e re  that it a lm o s t m ad e 
the c r ise s  o f 1975-7t> an d  1981-82 p a le  in co m p a riso n . Left v irtu a lly  h e lp le ss , 
A K onsfn  h an d ed  o v e r  the p re sid e n tia l sash  to C a rlo s  M en em  in Ju ly  1989  
m a rk in g  th e first d e m o cra tic  tran sfera l o f p o w er in o v e r  60  years.
V, T h e  M en em  A d m in is tra tio n : 1 989-1993  
It w as in th is a tm o sp h e re  that M en em  w h o had ca m p a ig n ed  as a tru e- 
b lu e  P ero n is t cam e to o ffice , l i e  laced  a p erp lex in g  situ a tio n , h ith er he w o u ld  
h av e  to  s tick  to  his p o p u lis t cam p aig n  p ro m ise  of a la rg e  w ag e in crea se  and  
face the co n se q u e n ce s  o f a rep lay  o f the m id -1 9 7 0  s (th e  m ilita ry ’ re s tle ssn e ss  
had a lre a d y  b een  d e m o n stra te d  d u rin g  A lfo n sin  s final y e a rs  in o ffice ); o r  he 
co u ld  op t for a s ta b iliz a tio n  p ro g ram  in o rd er to sto p  the e co  n om ic c o lla p se  
a lread y  u n d erw a y  all at th e ex p e n se  o f a lien a tin g  th o se w h o had g iv en  h im  his 
p o sitio n . S w iftly , and w ith o u t h esita tio n , he op ted  tor the latter If s ta tism  
had p ro v en  itsell a fa ilu re  in Cent ral  and Pastern  P u ro p e in P>s9, it had a lso  
d o n e  so  in A rg e n tin a .'^  T h e p o lic ies and  g o a ls  o f the M en em  a d m in is tra tio n  
w o u ld  so o n  sh ow  th e m se lv e s  to be the m ost fa r-re a ch in g  sine** those o f  h is 
p a r ty ’s fo u n d er: Juan Perdn. N ot on ly  did  th ey  aim  at d ism a n tlin g  the d e ca d e s  
o ld  sta tist s tru ctu re , but th ey  a lso  th reaten ed  to d estro y  the o v er forty  y ear o ld  
P ero n ist co a litio n  o f la b o r u n io n s and n a tio n a lis ts
P illa rs  o f S tru ctu ra l R eform
A t th e  co re  o f M en em  s reform  p a ck a g e  has been  p riv a tiz a tio n . U n lik e  
fo rm e r p riv a tiz a tio n  sch e m e s that p ro v ed  to be too  tim iu  o r b o g g ed  d o w n  in 
p o litic s  to  su cce e d , the cu rre n t p ro cess  is a lm o st s te a m ro lle r in g  all o p p o s itio n  
W illia m  C . S m ith  d e sc r ib e s  M en em  s o b je c tiv e s  as fo llo w s:
M e n e m ’s p r iv a tiz a tio n , lik e  those e lse w h e re  in L a tin  A m erica , 
p u rsu ed  sev era l key o b je ctiv e s : to  re d u ce  the fiscal d e fic it and 
g e n e ra te  ad d itio n al liq u id ity  for the s ta b iliz a tio n  o f the eco n o m y ; 
to  red u ce  the e x tern a l d eb t and a lle v ia te  b a la n ce -o f-p a v m e n t 
p re ssu re s  th ro u g h  co n v e rs io n  of d ebt in to  eq u ity  sh a re s  in
that took place during Perdn's first term in office, and for many years 
symbolized national economic sovereignty. YPF — the state petroleum 
monopoly -  has also historically been a symbol of national independence. An 
earlier attempt to open YPF to foreign capital under the Frondizi administra­
tion worked to undermine support for the government. These nationalist 
identities, although not nearly as strong as in years past, still exist. Menem's 
attempt to make the provincial government cover their respective railroad 
deficits in preparation for privatization or face an end of services in 1992 led to 
such an uproar that the idea was shelved for another year. A bomb detonation 
outside the YPF headquarters just days after Congressional approval for YPF 
privatization shows that some Argentines still cling to these institutions as 
symbols of national sovereignty. These privatizations, however, must be 
pushed through if Menem is to come off as completely dedicated to 
privatization and structural reform. The annual losses of these two companies 
are just too great to allow otherwise. 'The state railroads owed $964 million in 
1983 and cost the state $1.2 million a day in losses. More than half of the 
railway networks was deemed to be in bad or unusable condition . . . 
Meanwhile, the Argentine economy benefits little from the railway system,"95 
YPF, meanwhile, has the notorious reputation as the only oil company in the 
world to continually lose money
Aside from privatization, Argentina has also drastically reduced or 
eliminated tariffs and quantitative restrictions or most imports since Menem 
took office.^ Through trade liberalization, Menem seeks to both end 
Argentina's decades old flirt with isolationism and protectionism and add new 
components of competition and efficiency that in turn will lead to long-term
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economic growth and lower inflation. One of the major vehicles for increased 
foreign trade has been the formation of a regional common market Mercosur.
The process of regional integration developed out of the bilateral PICE 
agreement signed by Argentina and Brazil under Alfonsfn. Seeing the growing 
benefits of increased bilateral trade, Menem and former Brazilian President 
Fernando Collar de Mello signed the Acta de Buenos Aires in July of 1990 
which set December 31,1994 as a deadline for the formation of a common 
market free of all trade barriers. Both sides agreed that the process of bilateral 
integration should be accompanied by neo-liberal reforms in each country, and 
that a common foreign tariff and trade policy should be coordinated and 
established eventually be e s ta b lis h e d .^ ?  The process of tariff reduction was 
worked out in December of 1990 via the Acuerdo de Complementation 
Econdmica (ACE 14).
The regional giants' smaller neighbors, Uruguay and Paraguay, soon 
expressed their interest in expanding this customs union, and by March of 1991 
the four countries had signed the Treaty of Asuncion thus beginning the 
formation of Mercosur. By 1995 all four countries plan to have eliminated 
both tariff and non-tari;f barriers to inter-market trade. The Treaty of 
Asuncion provided for the creation of a transitory administrative structure to 
handle policy coordination on a wide variety of matters ranging from the 
regulation of services to the formation of a common external agenda.^ The 
ultimate goal of both Carlos Menem and his regional counterparts is to parti­
cipate in former U. S. President George Bush's Initiative for the Americas, and 
Mercosur members hope that regional integration will increase their bargain­
ing power with their northern counterparts.
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Two big obstacles, however, stand in the way of continued regional 
integration: the macroeconomic instability in Brazil combined with diametri 
cally opposed exchange rates (an overvalued fixed exchange rate in Argentina 
and a constantly devaluing, floating exchange rate in Brazil).^ A deep re­
cession in Brazil, polar opposite exchange rates and an economic boom in 
Argentina have caused Argentina's trade balance with Brazil to shrink from a 
small surplus in 1990 to an estimated $1.2 billion deficit in 1992.100 A lack of 
macroeconomic harmonization has led Argentine Economic Minister Doming 
Cavallo to both establish an export incentive scheme to encourage firms to 
specialize and develop better economies of scale and to go against the spirit of 
integration by raising tariffs. By temporarily raising a 3 pe mt statistics tax to 
10 percent, Cavallo hopes to offset the preferential rates on Brazilian and other 
Mercosur imports.101 Further integration is tantamount on Brazilian 
President Umar Franco's success in lowering inflation and re newing growth.
At least for now, most in Menem's administration agree that the current 
difficulties are only temporary and that Mercosur integration should be 
achieved first before attempts are made to link up with the still unsure North 
American Free Trade Association.!02
A third pillar of Menem's stabilization/structural adjustment plan is 
deregulation. "At the end of October 1991, the President announced in a 122- 
article decree that he was dismantling the regulatory boards. Health, safety and 
environmental regulations would remain, but controls on such purely eco­
nomic matters as opening hours, prices and fees would be settled in the mar­
ketplace, free from government interference." 103 These measures have 
helped reduce the costo argentine , the higher cost of doing business in 
Argentina, which served to bolster exports to all time highs.
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The forth, and arguably, the most important r.nd controversial pillar has 
been the Convertibility Law. 'The Convertibility Law is the most crucial of his 
economic measures, because it lays down that the monetary base of Argentine 
pesos will not exceed the value of the country's foreign reserves. ! very peso 
can be converted, one for one, into dollars."*^ Officially pegging the peso to 
the dollar undermined all immediate gam from currency speculation, and 
gave the Argentine populous the security it needed to restore capital to the 
productive sector, By having each peso backed by a dollar in foreign reserves, 
monetary policy became virtually tamper proof. There is no chance for the 
Central Bank, now de facto independent from the government, to undermine 
the fixed exchange rate by printing pesos to cover fiscal deficits, as was the case 
with Martinez de Hoz's 20 de Diciembre Plan. People have begun to treat the 
peso as a store of wealth and means of payment the way the U. S. dollar had for 
so long been treated.*05
Economic Ramifications of Reform 
The first thing one notices when looking at the economic figures pro­
duced since the structural adjustments were initiated in 1990 and 1991 is both a 
virtual collapse of the inflation rate and an enormous surge practically 
unparalleled in Argentina since the construction of the statist economy under 
Peron. In 1989 prices recorded their fastest rise in Argentine history with 
consumer prices escalating nearly 5000 percent. Faulty legislation in late 1989 
that obliged banks to transfer 80 percent of their deposits to the government 
which would then be used to pay salaries and subsidize provincial 
governments, led to a second round of vicious hyper-inflation, skyrocketing 
interest rates, and another currency collapse at the end of 1989 and beginning of 
1990.106 As a result the consumer price index went up by another 1343
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percent. By 1991, the year the Convertibility Law was passed, inflation fell to a 
near seventeen year low of 84 percent. By 1992, the consumer price index 
increased at its lowest rate since 1970 at 17.5 percent; while more importantly 
whole sale prices rose just barely 3 percent, their smallest increase since 1954. 
Economic growth has also been spectacular. Moving from a steep recession in 
1989 and virtual stagnation in 1990, real GDP grew by 8.5 percent in 1991 and 9.0 
percent in 1992.107 Growth rates not seen .n Argentina in decades. Although 
growth is expected to fall in 1993 to between 4.5 and 5.5 percent as consumer 
spending is replaced by investment led growth, these rates are still quite high 
in con parison to the post-World War II average. 108
International indicators also point mostly higher. Exports have contin 
ued to grow hitting an all time high in 1992. Meanwhile, public external debt 
should fall another $3.3 billion this year to $48 billion, a $6.3 billion decline 
since 1991.109 Foreign reserves are in an extremely healthy position at around 
$10 billion. The merchandise trade balance, however, has not fared so well. As 
a result of repressed demand during most of 1988-90, heavy con sumer 
spending in 1991 and in the first half of 1992 caused a 1990 trade surplus of 
nearly $9 billion to become a $2.87 billion deficit in 1992, the first trade deficit 
since 1981.110 Certain forecaster- such as LAM and EIU, predict a unall trade 
surplus this year due to export incentives a "statistical tax" on imports, slower 
growth, and a predicted exchange rate correction.!H Economic Minister 
Doming Cavallo, on the other hand, predicts several years of trade deficits 
reflecting long-term structural change, "’.n his view, Argentina in 1992-96/97. 
like West Germany in 1947-55 and Japan in 1947-61 will continue to receive 
strong net capital inflows, have a rapidly expanding domestic market, and
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therefore run a trade deficit year on year "112 Differences between the t wo 
views hinge mostly on the continuation of the fixed-exchange rate.
The Law of Convertibility has had many beneficial side-effects: 
exuhberant growth, the lowest inflation rates since 1970, and decreased specu­
lation to name a few. Its indefinite continuance, however might not be so 
healthy for the economy. First signs of renewed speculation appeared in 
November 1992 when there was a mini-run on the dollar. Destabilization was 
avoided when the government took further steps to dollarize the economy. 
"Economic Minister Domingo Cavallo adopted measures that included 
allowing checking accounts in dollars and the use of the dollar in economic 
transactions."! 13 In the short-term, this is manageable and likely to divert 
destructive speculation. Foreign reserves are still at record highs; but 
consumer prices have risen over 40 percent since the Convertibility Law was 
enacted in April of 1991 causing serious price distortion in relative prices and 
an overvalued peso. 114 The overvalued peso is sparking scenes reminiscent 
of Martinez de I loz's "sweet money", a growing trade deficit and a growing 
num ber of Argentine tourist saying "Damd dos" (give me two). Supporters of 
the plan's continuance argue that the whole sale price index is what is 
important, and it has grown by only 6.4 percent, an increase practically equal to 
that U. S. inflation during this time,! 15 Instead, they argue, are due more to 
the macroeconomic imbalances in Brazil. Whether Cavallo actually believes 
convertibility can last indefinitely or is playing a kill-or-be*killed game of 
chicken with speculators before this fall's election is impossible to tell. Most 
expert, however, predict a post-election devaluation.! 16
As hinted at earlier, 1993 will continue to be a big year for privatization, 
although probably not as big a year as 1992 was. "The government is
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forecasting its revenues from privatization in 1993 at around $3.5 bn, ac­
cording to officials in the economic team. This compares with earnings of $5.3 
bn in 1992."^^ These revenues and maintained fiscal austerity are expected to 
help the state register its second consecutive fiscal surplus, a truly remarkable 
accomplishment. As previously noted, state giants such as YPF, the state- 
owned insurance group (Caja Nacionai de Ahorro y Seguro), and various 
railroads are on this year's auction block. For the sake of efficiency, balanced 
budgets, and increased productivity privatization has been and will continue to 
be a good idea, but privatization and fiscal prudence do have at least one 
negative short-term side effect: higher unemployment.
Although Argentina's current unemployment rate of 7 percent is com 
parable to that of the U, S. and many other OECD nations, it is still one of the 
highest rates ever recorded in A r g e n t i n a H i g h e r  unemployment rates, 
however, are not just a side effect of the changes currently underway. 
Unemployment rates never quite recovered from the 1981-82 crisis. Having 
been as low as 2.0 percent in 1979 and 2.3 percent throughout 1980, unemploy­
ment was only able to recede to 3.1 percent in late 1983 before it began a gradual 
upward spiral during the rest of the decade. During the hyper-inflationary 
periods of 1989 and 1990 unemployment was 7.7 and 8.8 percent respectively. 
Renewed economic growth in 1991 through the present has yet to reduce 
unemployment to its historical average, yet it has kept it from exacerbating the 
situation caused by massive public sector layoffs.
Budgetary austerity trimmed 70,000 jobs between March and October of 
1991 and another 130,000 in the first half of 1 9 9 2 Further job cuts in some 
privatized state-industries added to these figures. The scenario is even worse 
when underemployment figures are combined, but all these job losses should
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be taken with a grain of salt. First of all, they are bound to accompany any 
major structural reform. As flabby, over-protected industries now face 
international competition, job cuts have to be made. At the same time, 
however, modernization and massive investments in such areas as 
telecommunications are likely to create jobsJ 20 Over the long-run, addi­
tional private sector jobs should be able to lower these figures substantially.
So far, Menem's neo-liberal restructuring of the economy is having 
fantastic aggregate results. Argentina has not had such continual growth since 
the "Golden Decade", 1964-74, an it looks like talk of the "Argentine Miracle" 
could actually have some foundation. Continued growth, however, could 
depend just as much on politics as it does economics.
The Political Ramifications of Restructuring 
The political consequences of Menem's policies are as exciting and 
possibly as monumental as the structural changes themselves. Populist 
policies, the labor unions, and nationalist elements in society landed Menem 
his presidential victory in May of 1989. These elements have suffered the 
brunt of the stabilization policies' harsh effects, and government attitudes 
towards labor are the least conciliatory since the 1976-83 military regime. The 
Peronist party is undergoing a lot of internal stress and could very well splinter 
apart. The main opposition, however, is even more divided. Fall elections 
could have the final say in just how far this revolution in party realignments 
and structural adjustments could go.
To begin with, Menem has done just about everything possible to dis­
associate himself from the policies and people that elected him. "Menem's 
attitude towards the trade union movement was epitomized in March 1990 
when he publicly declared that he would not even read an economic counter-
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proposal to his privatisation-stabilisation programme drawn up by an 
orthodox Peronist section of the General Labor Confederation (CGT)."121 
Both business and labor's vested interest were hampered by the dismantling of 
the statist economy. Heated disapproval of economic policy, Mcnem's first 
Labor Minister, and his subsequent proposal of a two year strike-free guarantee 
caused the CGT to split into pro- and anti-Menem factions as early as October 
1989.122 The split has healed and reappeared ever since then. * 23
Regressive labor legislation, historically high unemployment, and un­
believably low real wages could further erode Menem's support from the 
traditional "descamiMitos." Wage increases have been tied to growth in pro­
ductivity, and to further infuriate labor leaders new labor legislation has been 
introduced into Congress that will reform employment contracts, com­
pensation for redundancy and accidents at work, productivity and salary 
structures, and union representation among other things; all in attempts to 
reduce Argentine labor costs and increase Argentina's competitive position in 
Mercosur.124 As mentioned, unemployment has yet to subside, but more 
importantly, real wages have been at post-World War lows since Menem took 
office. Hyper-inflation in 1989-90 eroded already low 1988 wages by another 57 
percent, and in order to maintain low inflation, wage increases have been tied 
to increases in productivity. As of 1991, real wages were still below the 
draconian levels of the early Videla administration (1976-78).
Special attention should also be paid to the fall in labor's participation in 
GDP. Since 1975, Argentina has witnessed a drastic "latinamericanization" in 
income distribution. In 1975, wages and salaries accounted for 53.8 percent of 
GDP and the top 10 percent of income recipi ents accounted for 35 percent of 
GDP.125 These numbers deteriorated under both military and democratic
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regimes so that by the end of the 1980's wages and salaries accounted for barely 
30 percent of GDP while the top 10 percent of all Argentines were earning 46 
percent of CDP.^26 Both labor unions and the Catholic Church have harshly 
criticized the government for the growing poverty (now estimated to affect 
nearly a third of Argentine society) and it is apparent betrayal of the traditional 
Peronist pursuit of social justice.
At the same time, business leaders and many of the more wealthy 
Argentine are starting to embrace the President whose party made them fear 
for their livelihood just a few years before. So far, these people have been the 
ones to benefit most from the neo-liberal restructuring, and they also stand the 
most to lose if the process is derailed. Menem's close coop eration with the 
centrist-right UCeDe party Is giving a political voice to a sector of society that 
has gone years without a consistent democratic voice.
The disarray in the Radical Civic Union makes the scenario even more 
interesting. One faction bolsters Fernando De la Rua, the Buenos Aires senator 
who sent Menem's hand-picked senatorial candidate to a humiliating defeat in 
June of 1992. Another side backs Cordoban Governor, Hduardo Angelo/ who 
lost to Menem in the 1989 presidential election after campaigning on a 
platform that is remarkably similar to the reforms Menem has put in place. 
Lastly, devout followers of former President Raul Alfonsin back his drive to 
start a social democratic movement hoping to unite labor and other leftist 
leaning causes in a bid for the 1995 presidential election.
This, by no means, insinuates that Menem is contemplating just one 
presidential term. Like his predecessor, Alfonsin, Menem is seeking that 
crucial two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress so that a special 
assembly can be started to consider constitutional reform. Menem's first steps
were to minimize the damage already done to his support from labor. "The 
cabinet changes announced, in particular, the appointment of Enrique 
Rodriguez to the labour ministry, undoubtedly represent an attempt to placate 
the unions, which in November showed their general displeasure with 
menemismo by staging a general strike"127 jn addition, a "social plan" is 
being formed to counter attacks that the neo-liberal policies are to blame for the 
widespread poverty. Finances have been strengthened enough that some in 
creased spending will be possible without reheating inflationary pressure A 28 
The exact amount of spending is crucial. Too little is not likely to convince 
many in the country's lower classes, that have been hurt most by reform, that 
menemismo offers them a brighter future. Too much spending is likely to 
rekindle inflationary pressure and expectations, wrecking the Convertibility 
Plan. At first glance, it appears that Menem is avoiding the dangerously 
populist tendencies of his political predecessor, Juan Peron. After Economic 
Minister Domingo Cavallo warned that revenues would be lower than 
expected this year due to more moderate growth, Menem agreed to a 10 percent 
cutback in public sector spending so that substantial fiscal surpluses will be 
maintained in order to keep foreign debt-servicing current.* 29
A third economic-political move could have a much greater long-term 
effect. A current bill in Congress seeks to partially privatize the national 
pension fund. New private pension funds are expected to bring in foreign 
capital and management expertise when they start opening in 1994 possibly 
providing a big boost to the stock exchange. A state-run fund guaranteeing a 
minimum rate of return is also in the works.130 jn the long-run, this will 
give individual workers a vested-interest in the success of structural reforms 
and growth. Similar pensions funds are playing an important role in Chile's
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current economic boom.!31 ‘Whatever Menem does, he will need to develop 
political support by firming up and expanding his as of yet informal and 
insecure new alliance." *32 The Personist party is split over the traditional 
populism and the new found menemismo . Some like Buenos Aires 
Governor, Eduardo Duhalde, firmly support the reforms.!33 Others do not. 
These division will have to be patched, at least temporarily, if Menem is to 
have any chance at re-election in 1995. After all, Peronist need to do better in 
this election than in 1989 if a Constitutional amendment changing the limit on 
p re sid e n tia l term  can  ev en  be d e b a te d , that a lo n e  is a steep  o rd er.
C o n c lu s io n
Regardless of the Constitutional reform, Menem has introduced 
elements of great potential change in both economics and politics. 
Economically, Argentina is in a position so stable and positioned for such 
growth that the crisis of 1989-90 seems like a distant memory. Politically, the 
traditional party lines could undergo a massive restructuring. Peronism, or 
better Menemism, could unite business and industrial interests in its new 
form. The middle class, a traditional Radical base, could even be won over, at 
least in the short-term, by the unusual stability. Labor could go one of many 
ways: to the far left Intrasergiente, to Alfonsfn's social democratic movement, 
or possibly remain completely loyal to the Peronist party. It should be kept in 
mind that nothing is stepping a new populist demagogue from promising the 
moon if benefits from these reforms fail to trickle down. One thing is sere; in 
May 1989, no one expected a populist maverick from the back-water province 
of La Rioja to rescue Argentina from the verge of economic suicide and a few 
short years later transform a rotting economic structure into a potential 
economic miracle. In a country riddled with a centuries old history of long
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periods of massive economic growth followed by long periods of stagnation, 
Argentina could be awakening from its 60 year old dormancy for 60 years of 
economic, and this time, political progress.
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Statistical Appendix
Table 1 Rate of change in consumer prices wholesale prices 
and implicit GDP (%)a *=prediction 
Consumer Prices Wholesale Prices Implicit Prices in GDP
1945 19.7 20.7 16.6
1946 17.7 16.6 24.2
1947 13.5 2.4 220
1948 13.1 16.3 20.0
1949 31 1 220 25.0
1950 25.5 21.3 22.7
1951 36.7 48.6 34.8
1952 38.7 30.9 250
1953 4.0 11.8 8.4
1954 3.8 3.1 7.7
1955 12.3 9.0 10.5
1936 13.4 26.0 25.5
1957 24.7 24.1 21.5
1958 31 6 30.7 36.7
1959 113.7 1335 102.2
1960 27.1 15.7 18.6
1961 13.5 8.3 9.7
1962 28.1 30.3 28.5
1963 26.0 288 28,2
1964 221 26 1 27.5
1965 28.6 22.2 27.3
1966 31.9 21.7 226
1967 29.2 25.6 24.4
1968 16,2 9.6 9.7
1969 7.6 6.1 9.1
1970 13.6 14.1 11.8
1971 34.7 34.2 35.4
1972 58.5 84.0 620
1973 60.3 30.0 56.8
1974 24.2 20.0 310
1975 182.8 192.5 194.1
1976 444.0 499.0 499,0
1977 176.1 149.4 158.2
1978 175.6 146.0 155.8
1979 159.9 149.3 1525
1980 100.8 75.4 83.3
1981 1045 109.6 107.4
1982 164.8 256.2 225.8
1983 343.2 360.8 355.0
1984 688.0 626.7
1985 387.7 672.2
1986 81.9 90.1
1987 174.8 131.3
1988 387.7 343.0
1989 4923.8 30791
1990 1343,9 1343.9
1991 84.0 84.0
1992 175 17.2
1993 13.4* 13.4*
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
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Table 2: GDP Growth and Real Wages and Fiscal Deficits** *=prediction 
GDP (%) Rea) Wages(1970=100) Fiscal Dcficit(%GDP)
-4.8 663 45
8.3 64.1 6.9
13,8 78.3 58
1.1 925 13,4
-4.5 933 98
15 86,7 55
3.9 82.0 45
-5.1 75,7 5.6
5.4 79.6 8.8
4.1 86.9 85
7.1 845 6.9
2.8 90.6 5.0
5.1 873 55
6.1 96.8 9.6
-6.4 74,2 2.9
7.8 745 2.7
7.1 82,7 56
-1.6 81.7 7.9
-2.4 81.7 58
103 90.2 63
9.1 98.4 3,4
0.6 98.9 4.7
2.7 96,7 4.1
43 91.7 1.9
8.6 96.4 0.9
5.4 1(X).0 2.4
3.6 1053 3.1
1.6 99,0 4.0
3.4 1073 7.9
65 126.4 95
■0,9 123,7 153
-0.2 793 15.1
6.0 75.6 118
-3.9 773 13.6
68 86.1 105
0? 100.0 13.0
-6.2 913 16.7
-5.2 793 16,4
3.1 102.6 198
20 1675 118
-4.4 113.1 5.7
6.1 110.0 4.9
21 1208 68
-28 935 9.0
-4.6 421 83
-0.2 402
a5 56.0 18
9.0 -0.1
45* -03*
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